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ABSTRACT
In April 2015, BitTorrent Inc. released their distributed peer-to-peer powered browser,
Project Maelstrom, into public beta. The browser facilitates a new alternative website dis-
tribution paradigm to the traditional HTTP-based, client-server model. This decentralised
web is powered by each of the visitors accessing each Maelstrom hosted website. Each user
shares their copy of the website;s source code and multimedia content with new visitors.
As a result, a Maelstrom hosted website cannot be taken oine by law enforcement or any
other parties. Due to this open distribution model, a number of interesting censorship, secu-
rity and privacy considerations are raised. This paper explores the application, its protocol,
sharing Maelstrom content and its new visitor powered web-hosting paradigm.
Keywords: Project Maelstrom, BitTorrent, decentralised web, alternative web, browser
forensics
1. INTRODUCTION
Project Maelstrom was released as a private
alpha in December 2014 [Klinker, 2014] and
as a public beta in April 2015 [Klinker, 2015].
Its purpose is to provide a decentralised web
ecosystem facilitating a new parallel to the
existing world wide web. Through this de-
centralisation, users are free to create and
share any content they desire without the
need for web hosting providers or domain
names, and can bypass any national or in-
ternational censorship. The HTML docu-
ments, associated styling and scripting ﬁles,
multimedia content, etc., are hosted by the
website's visitors, and subsequently served
to other visitors accessing the site. The of-
ﬁcial BitTorrent blog celebrated its arrival
as:
Truly an Internet powered by peo-
ple, one that lowers barriers and
denies gatekeepers their grip on our
future [Klinker, 2014].
While the topic of BitTorrent in the media
seems to predominantly coincide with a dis-
cussion on online piracy [Choi and Perez,
2007], the protocol has proven itself as a ro-
bust, low-cost, distributed alternative to the
traditional client-server content distribution
model. From a forensic standpoint, the de-
centralised nature of BitTorrent based appli-
cations can result in extended windows for
evidence acquisition [Scanlon et al., 2014].
Aside from facilitating copyright infringe-
ment, a number of additional online services
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have been developed using the protocol in-
cluding:
 File Synchronisation Service  BitTor-
rent Sync is a cloudless alternative to
the cloud-based, multiple-device, ﬁle
synchronisation services such as Drop-
box, OneDrive, iCloud, etc. [Scanlon
et al., 2015]. With a standard BitTor-
rent Sync install, users are not limited
in the amount of data they can share as
there are no replicated server-side limi-
tations.
 Cost-Eﬀective Commercial Content
Distribution  BitTorrent Inc. use
the protocol to distribute commercial
multimedia content through their
BitTorrent Bundle oﬀering. Large
video game creators and distribution
companies, Blizzard Entertainment and
Valve have used the BitTorrent proto-
col to distribute installation ﬁles and
software patches to their users [Watters
et al., 2011]. The advantage for these
companies is that the protocol excels
where the traditional client-server
model starts to fail; the more users, the
faster the average download speed.
1.1 Contribution of this Work
The contribution of this work can be sum-
marised as:
 An overview and analysis of Project
Maelstrom's functionality.
 An analysis of the forensic value of its
installation and conﬁguration ﬁles.
 An investigation of evidence left behind
after uninstallation and what knowledge
be recovered.
2. BACKGROUND
READING
2.1 Peer-to-Peer Facilitated
Web Browsing
The deep web refers to layers of Internet ser-
vices and communication that is not readily
accessible to most users and is not crawlable
by traditional search engines. Unlike the reg-
ular Internet, there is not one set of pro-
tocols or formats for the deep web, instead
deep web is a generic term used to describe
Internet communications that are managed
using closed or somehow restricted proto-
cols. More recently however, the term deep
web has been made synonymous with black-
market sites such as The Silk Road, taken
oine by the FBI in 2013. While BitTorrent
Inc. do not claim that Project Maelstrom
enhances privacy or anonymises a user's In-
ternet traﬃc, many of the competing decen-
tralised deep web technologies focus their ef-
forts on precisely that.
2.1.1 The Freenet Project
The Freenet project is a peer based dis-
tributed Internet alternative. Users con-
nect to Freenet through an installed appli-
cation that uses multiple encrypted connec-
tions to mask the identifying network in-
formation and the data location. Freenet
peers, or nodes, store fragments of data in
a distributed fashion. The number of times
a data item is replicated is dependent on
the demand for that data. More popular
ﬁles have more available sources resulting
in better availability and faster access times
for the requester. The layered encryption
of the connections provides an eﬀective de-
fence against network sniﬃng attacks and
also complicates network forensic analysis.
Freenet, by default, is deployed as an Open-
Net service. On OpenNet, it is possible to
enumerate and connect to all available nodes
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and perform traﬃc correlation to trace back
to the original requester [Roos et al., 2014].
2.1.2 Tor
Tor (The Onion Router) is a networking pro-
tocol designed to provide anonymity while
accessing both regular websites, and those
hosted within the Tor network. Initially, Tor
provided random internal encrypted routes
enabling anonymised regular website access
for its users. This was achieved through a
minimum of three encrypted connections be-
fore exiting to the regular Internet through
an exit node.
A user can opt not to utilise an exit
node and instead browse content on ser-
vices hosted within the Tor network itself.
These Tor websites are known as Hidden
Services (HS) and the identity and geoloca-
tion of the hosting server are obfuscated, in
a similar fashion to the website's visitors.
This anonymisation would normally make
any form of dependable routing impossible
as any DNS lookup would not be able to re-
port a static IP address for the service for the
client system to connect to. Instead, hidden
services use a distributed hash table (DHT)
and a known service advertising node to in-
form clients of their presence and the path
to the service provided.
Due to the reliance of the HS on DHT
and directory servers to perform the intro-
ductions for Tor users, Biryukov et al. [2013]
were able to demonstrate a denial of service
attack on a HS by impersonating the direc-
tory servers. They were also able to crawl
the DHT to harvest Onion Identiﬁers over a
period of two days, resulting in an accurate
index of the content of the deep web con-
tained within Tor. This approach could be
useful when attempting to stall a HS until it
can be properly identiﬁed.
Figure 1. Project Maelstrom Default Start
Page
2.1.3 I2P
The Invisible Internet Project (I2P) is of-
ten considered another anonymisation utility
like TOR. However, its garlic routing proto-
col is intended to create an alternative In-
ternet. In this model, all traﬃc takes place
via unidirectional tunnels established out to
a resource which responds with its own, dif-
ferent, tunnelled return path. In this way
all traﬃc to and from a host is protected by
a separate session based tunnel that closely
resembles that of TOR, but I2P was not in-
tended to allow access to sites or services
outside of the I2P network itself. In this re-
gard, I2P more closely resembles Tor Hidden
Services. In I2P, the traﬃc is encrypted end-
to-end and the encryption in either direction
is handled separately [Zantout and Haraty,
2011].
3. PROJECT
MAELSTROM:
APPLICATION
ANALYSIS
Project Maelstrom is built upon the open
source version of Google's Chrome browser,
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Chromium, as can be seen in Figure 1.
3.1 Installation
The version of Project Maelstrom analysed
as part of this paper has the following
properties
File: Maelstrom.exe
Size: 36,971KB
MD5: d3b6560c997a37a1359721fdaa25925f
SHA1: 9de7c48e324b2ac9240ca168b7c2afd46bd1c799
Origin: download-lb.utorrent.com
version: 37.0.2.1
All testing was carried out on a virtual
machine running Windows 7 with 1GB ram
and a thin provisioned 60gb hard drive.
The Project Maelstrom installation pro-
cess is in two parts. The ﬁrst part installs a
browser based on Chrome that acts as a user
interface for the Maelstrom network. The
second is the BitTorrent Maelstrom appli-
cation that handles caching of torrents and
maintains connection to the distributed hash
table (dht).
Once executed, the Project Maelstrom
installer extracts the required installa-
tion ﬁles to a TEMP directory in \Users
\<username> \Appdata. Chrome.7z and
setup.exe are stored in a directory created at
\Local\Maelstrom\Application\<version
number>\Installer.
All pre-deﬁned URLs used during in-
stallation are stored within settings ﬁles
extracted from the Chrome.7z package
and IP addresses are resolved as required
through standard DNS queries. This allows
the source servers to change addresses
without invalidating older installation
packages. The Project Maelstrom spe-
ciﬁc URLs at the time of writing are:
https://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com,
router.bittorrent.com,
update.browser.bittorrent.com,
router.utorrent.com,
bench.utorrent.com,
tracker.openbittorrent.com,
tracker.publicbt.com, and
https://s3-us-east-1-elb.amazonaws
.com.
The ﬁrst URL contacted is
router.bittorrent.com which acts as a
registration point for the client and
a way to initiate DHT participation.
update.browser.bittorrent.com runs
a script on connection which checks the
version of the client connecting and gen-
erates a redirect to download the relevant
update if applicable. The update check is
triggered when the local client sends a GET
/windows/latest.json request and, if an
update is required the response contains a
URL http://update.browser.bittorrent
.com/windows/<latestversionnumber>/
mini_installer.exe. This secondary in-
staller silently deploys a new folder alongside
the original version with the new version
number and the preferences and path ﬁles
are updated accordingly.
As part of the installation procedure
Project Maelstrom installs the following ex-
ecutables to the \Application\ directory:
maelstrom.exe (desktop shortcut target)
MD5: 44d2641129cc922c5bc3545db8c8cda7
chrome.native.torrent.exe(browser torrent
manager)
MD5: 85871a540cd77a3c419658fbe21c682b
These executables are copies of ﬁles stored
in the <version> subfolder and any update
will cause the current ﬁles to be renamed
with a preﬁx of old_ before being re-
placed with the later version. The ﬁle
VisualElementsManifest.xml contains
references to logos and other application
images that include the <version> number
to indicate which is the current active
subfolder though unless manually altered
this will usually indicate the latest version
installed.
The subfolder
\Application\<version>\webui con-
tains the base ﬁles for displaying default
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Chromium fonts, backgrounds, borders as
well as all the ﬁles necessary for the start
page and the index.html and images for the
Project Maelstrom onboarding homepage
partly depicted in ﬁgure1
In addition to the Application folder
AppData\Local\Maelstrom\User Data\ is
provisioned to store user speciﬁc data includ-
ing user preferences, browser and torrent set-
tings and browsing history. The majority of
ﬁles are stored in the Default folder which
contains a subset of the standard Chrome in-
stallation ﬁles in addition to ﬁles speciﬁc to
Project Maelstrom. These will be covered
in section 3.3 with the other ﬁles of forensic
value to an investigator.
The second part of the installation in-
volves the deployment of the BitTorrent
Maelstrom folder in \Users \<username>
\Appdata\Roaming\ to handle all torrent
and DHT related activities. Any new
torrents requested are saved here along with
the corresponding .resume ﬁle. Torrent con-
tent is stored in the cache folder to speed
up future access to to act as a repository
to be shared with other users. On instal-
lation the root folder is used to store the ﬁles
8E65684D700ECC41A09A60EE58991845EA56F734.resume
8E65684D700ECC41A09A60EE58991845EA56F734.torrent
which are the torrent ﬁles associated with
the Project Maelstrom Startpage.
3.2 Settings
Being built on Chromium, Project Mael-
strom has all of the same browsing op-
tions available to the user. A stan-
dard installation has the same browser
defaults set as a standard Chrome in-
stallation. One setting of interest is
found in Settings > Advanced Settings
> System. The option to continue run-
ning background apps when Maelstrom is
closed is enabled by default. This will re-
sult in the chrome.native.torrent.exe ex-
ecutable running and sharing cached website
torrent data from the users system without
any visible indicator. In testing the data rate
was observed to maintain at an average 800
bytes per second up and 800 bytes per sec-
ond down. This was most likely just DHT
updates and ping traﬃc. At any given time
there were approximately 50 concurrent con-
nections recorded.
The Project Maelstrom speciﬁc settings
can be found in the Torrent section of the
settings page. Each settings is customisable
but at the time of installation the defaults
are:
 Cache Size  The amount of space avail-
able to store cached torrent data is set
to 5GB with a warning not to exceed
100GB.
 Sharing Ratio  A slider can be used to
change the ratio from 0 upload to unlim-
ited upload. The default setting is up-
load data is equal to the amount down-
loaded. This sharing ratio is measured
on a per torrent basis and is presented
to the user as a measure of contribution.
 Rate Limits  The default setting is to
not restrict upload or download speeds.
 Transfer Limit  The default setting is
not to impose a cap on total transfer
amounts.
 Port Settings  A port is selected at in-
stallation as the static communication
port. This port number can be cus-
tomised here or can be set to be ran-
domly selected.
 Proxy Server  The proxy settings for
torrent transfers can be selected from a
dropdown list including SOCKS which
will allow for the use of TOR for added
anonymity. By default, no proxy is se-
lected.
 Privacy  By default the option to send
anonymous crash data to BitTorrent
Inc. is enabled.
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3.3 Files of Forensic value
During the ﬁrst run the settings and
preferences ﬁles stored in User Data and
Application are populated. at the same
time, the torrent speciﬁc settings and dis-
covery are recorded in the Roaming di-
rectory. Because of Project Maelstrom's
roots in the Chromium browser, many of
the same forensically important resources
are present. However, the dual nature of
the utility does present some degree of dif-
ference.For example, while the History tab
shows the bittorrent:// and magnet://
sites visited, the content for these sites
is not stored in the standard caches or
data ﬁles. Instead checking the output of
about:cache in the browser will only show
standard website ﬁles. All caching and man-
agement relating to torrents are stored in the
Roaming\BitTorrent Maelstrom folder.
 Local\Maelstrom\Application  This
directory contains initial setup ﬁles and
content added during installation. Of
most use is conﬁrmation of an active
installation, timestamps to indicate in-
stall time and a record of the initial set-
tings.
 Local\Maelstrom\User Data  con-
tains the majority of the user speciﬁc
settings and activity records. This
folder and its subfolders can be ex-
amined using established forensic tech-
niques for use on Chrome browsers but
also includes some new ﬁles that may be
of use.
1. The history SQLite3 database ﬁle
stored in the default folder will
contain both the magnet:? URI
and the resolved bittorrent://
address. The magnet:? entry will
have a title (same as the torrent
ﬁle), while the bittorrent:// ad-
dress will have the title of the
index.html page contained in the
bundle.
2. Origin Bound Certs will only con-
tain the certiﬁcates speciﬁc to the
normal internet browsing activi-
ties.
3. The HTML rendered after
scripts have been run is stored
in the Cache directory. for
example, the full HTML of
bittorrent://welcome is stored
as part of f_000005.
4. Local Storage  contains persis-
tent information used by visited
websites. From the ﬁrst run this
will contain the Unique ID used
by bench.utorrent.com to gather
anonymous usage statistics. The
contents of this folder are SQLite3
databases with individual data sets
stored as blobs
5. Session Storage  contains a list
of BitTorrent UUIDs. The ﬁrst
UUID matches that stored in the
bench.utorrent local storage ﬁle.
The remainder are those of remote
peers the browser is in contact
with.
 Roaming\BitTorrent Maelstrom\
Contains the bulk of the torrent han-
dling and storage elements of Project
Maelstrom. The root folder has many
items of forensic value including:
1. <bt.infohash>.torrent  The
torrent ﬁle used to locate and
download resources from peers.
This is a standard torrent ﬁle for-
mat listing all sub-ﬁles contained
within the bundle and the hashes
for each piece and the trackers.
2. <bt.infohash>.resume  A re-
sume ﬁle created to allow .tor-
rent data processing to be paused
and continued without having to
restart to ensure full data trans-
fer. The creation of the resume
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ﬁle could be used as a guideline to
when the related .torrent was ﬁrst
processed.
3. dht.dat  This consists of a ben-
coded list of observed IP:Port com-
binations of peers participating in
the DHT. The content starts with
the value id20:, which is followed
by the BitTorrent client's unique
ID on the DHT network. It is then
followed by the number of observed
nodes or peers and a listing of the
IP:Port pairs in 6 byte IPv4 repre-
sentations.
4. settings.dat  This ﬁle contains
the torrent client settings and the
usage statistics.
5. Cache  This stores the down-
loaded torrent ﬁles, which corre-
spond to the name of the torrent
appended with the btinfohash of
the piece. Scripts and web pages
are loaded and executed from
this directory to improve browsing
speed for the user and to provide a
repository to share to other peers.
6. trusted folder  This stores the
bittorrent.crt ﬁle for use in
peer secure transfer negotiation.
3.4 Local File Remnants
While there is no dedicated uninstall exe-
cutable for Project Maelstrom, the registry
key
HKCU\<user>\Software\Microsoft\Windows\
CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Maelstrom
UninstallString
shows the control panel remove program
options to be the equivalent of running
AppData\Local\Maelstrom\Application\
<version> \Installer\setup.exe
−−uninstall
By default the option to remove user
history is not checked. If left as de-
fault, all of the ﬁles and folders in
AppData\Local\Maelstrom\User Data\ is
left intact including any history and cookie
folders as well as user speciﬁc settings and
preferences.
If the option to remove User his-
tory is selected then the entire
AppData\Local\Maelstrom\ folder and all
subfolders are removed. However, in either
scenario the AppData\Roaming\BitTorrent
Maelstrom\ folder is left untouched along
with all of the subfolders and ﬁles con-
tained therein including dht.dat and any
.torrent and .resume ﬁles that may have
been stored. Additionally all cached data
held in the cache directory is left intact and
retrievable.
4. PROJECT
MAELSTROM:
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
4.1 Accessing a Website
Project Maelstrom supports all of the reg-
ular protocols that ship with Chromium,
alongside two BitTorrent ecosystem speciﬁc
URIs; bittorrent:// and magnet:?.
In order to load any given webpage, the
browser must:
1. Resolve the magnet link to a .torrent
ﬁle.
2. Identify other peers currently serving
that webpage.
3. Identify any torrents contained within
the webpage bundle.
4. Cache part ﬁles and store them as
blocks of the whole in sequence.
5. Process any scripts that determine con-
tent.
6. Update the sharing status of the local
content to include the new webpage.
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4.1.1 Peer Discovery
In order to discover an initial set of peers the
client contacts router.bittorrent.com.
The packet requesting peers contains the
command ﬁnd_nodes and is bencoded
with the Local Peer ID followed by the Bit-
Torrent share ID. In response a bencoded
list of registered peers is returned, each with
a 26 byte entry consisting of a 20 byte
PeerID and a 6 byte IP:Port entry. The local
client then uses DHT_Ping to discover live
hosts and standard torrent discovery is per-
formed as described in the BitTorrent Exten-
sion Protocols (BEP)  speciﬁcally BEP005
deals with DHT discovery and bootstrapping
[Loewenstern and Norberg, 2008]. Any peer
that has the chrome.native.torrent.exe
executable running, even if the Maelstrom
browser is shutdown, that has the torrent in
its cache will become available as valid con-
tent source.
4.1.2 Content Negotiation
Links in Project Maelstrom are handled ei-
ther as torrent ﬁles or as magnet:? links.
If a magnet link is followed the Mael-
strom browser must ﬁrst resolve the data
provided in the link to a valid torrent
ﬁle. This is achieved either by looking
up the tracker URL included in the mag-
net link using the tr parameter or one
of the default trackers deﬁned at installa-
tion. Once discovered the torrent ID is
then used to construct find_nodes requests
that are sent to the known DHT peers and
router.bittorrent.com.
4.2 Maelstrom Development
The development of websites for distribu-
tion through Maelstrom does not require
any special consideration during the develop-
ment of the website content, i.e., the HTML,
CSS, JavaScript, graphics, multimedia con-
tent, etc. Where the traditional web devel-
opment process diﬀers is with regards to the
uploading of content to a web server. These
websites can be delivered either as a single
large torrent resource broken into pieces or,
for ease of maintenance and to avoid users
having to re-download the entire site ev-
ery time the content is changed, as a series
of .torrent ﬁles linked by an encompassing
Bundle.
To make the process more streamlined,
BitTorrent Inc. have developed a number of
helper tools and guidelines [BitTorrent Inc.,
2015].
5. CONCLUSION
It is envisioned that the popularity of
Project Maelstrom (and similar decen-
tralised alternatives) will increase in the
coming months and years due to its ease of
use, easy web-authoring and zero-cost model
(to content creators and consumers alike).
Perhaps BitTorrent Inc. will have the abil-
ity to raise their new Internet from the deep
web into the hands of regular Internet users.
5.1 Future Work
With the browser just having been recently
released as a public beta, there remains
much to be discovered regarding the nuances
of this decentralised web. Some areas for fu-
ture work include:
 Development of a tool capable of mon-
itoring who is accessing any speciﬁc
Maelstrom-only website. The decen-
tralised nature of the protocol leaves
it vulnerable for third-parties to garner
visitor information statistics that are
normally reserved for the administrator
of the web host such as location, access
duration, ﬁles downloaded, frequency of
repeat visits, content available for shar-
ing, etc.
 Perform an analysis of ZeroNet [Ze-
roNet, 2015], an open source Project
Maelstrom alternative. ZeroNet does
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not require the use of a speciﬁc browser
 instead running as a service on the lo-
cal machine.
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